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We show that in a variant of the minority game problem, the agents can reach a state of maximum
social efficiency, where the fluctuation between the two choices is minimum, by following a simple
stochastic strategy. By imagining a social scenario where the agents can only guess about the
number of excess people in the majority, we show that as long as the guessed value is sufficiently
close to the reality, the system can reach a state of full efficiency or minimum fluctuation. A
continuous transition to less efficient condition is observed when the guessed value becomes worse.
Hence, people can optimize their guess for excess population to optimize the period of being in
the majority state. We also consider the situation where a finite fraction of agents always decide
completely randomly (random trader) as opposed to the rest of the population who follow a certain
strategy (chartist). For a single random trader the system becomes fully efficient with majority-
minority crossover occurring every 2 days on average. For just two random traders, all the agents
have equal gain with arbitrarily small fluctuations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The minority game (MG) [1–4] is a game of repeated
choice of N (odd) non-communicating agents where the
agents ending up in the minority receive positive pay-
offs. This is a variant of the El Farol bar problem [5].
Existence of a phase transition has already been reported
in the MG [2].
One of the aims of the study of MG is to bring the pop-
ulations in either choices sufficiently close to (N − 1)/2
and in doing so to keep the time of convergence and fluc-
tuations low [3, 4]. As is readily seen, a random choice
would make the time of convergence virtually zero, but
the fluctuation would be of
√
N order. This makes the
system socially very inefficient. This is because, although
N/2 agents could be in the minority at the same time,
due to fluctuation this number may be much smaller than
that, thereby making the system socially inefficient due
to poor resource utilization. To increase social efficiency,
this fluctuation has to be minimised. Several adaptive
strategies were studied to improve upon this situation.
However, regarding the fluctuation, even for the most
complex strategies only the pre-factor could be made
smaller and the fluctuation still scales with
√
N . A large
misuse of resource is therefore likely in this situation.
There have been some recent attempts to study a
generalization of the MG problem in the Kolkata paise
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restaurant (KPR) problem, where there areN agents and
N ′ choices (restaurants). Keeping a finite comfort level
(equal in most cases) for the restaurants (say, one agent
per choice) one arrives at similar problem of finding the
most efficient strategy (non-dictated) for resource alloca-
tion [6–8]. It was shown that a simple crowd-avoiding,
stochastic, non-dictated strategy led to the most effi-
cient resource allocation for the problem in a very short
convergence time (practically independent of the system
size) [6, 9].
Stochastic strategies have been used also for the MG
problem [10]. Recently, Dhar et al. [11] used the KPR
strategy in the MG problem to find that the fluctuation
could be made arbitrarily small in a convergence time of
the order log logN . This, of course, is the best possible
strategy so far in terms of resource allocation in the MG.
However, this situation differs a bit from the classic MG
problem. The most important difference is that, being a
crowd-avoiding strategy, it requires that the agents know
not only whether they were in the minority or major-
ity the previous evening, but also the number of excess
people in the majority if he or she were there.
The present study intends to determine if knowing the
number of excess is indeed necessary in reaching a state
with minimum fluctuations. We show that even in a more
realistic situation where exact knowledge of the number
of excess people is not available to the agents, it is pos-
sible to reach a state with minimum fluctuations. A nat-
ural relaxation of the complete knowledge of the excess
crowd would be to make a guess about the actual value.
We show analytically for an idealized situation, where
all agents make the same guess, that if the guess value
is smaller than twice the real value, the minimum fluc-
tuation state (or the absorbing state) can be reached.
2However, for any larger error, a residual fluctuation pro-
portional to the excess error made, stays in the system
in the steady state. Further, in a generalized and more
realistic version, where the guesses differ and are ran-
dom for each agent in each step (annealed disorder), we
analytically and numerically find similar behavior in the
fluctuations in the system only in terms of the average
guess value this time. We show that depending upon the
guessing power of the agents, there is a continuous phase
transition between full (minimum fluctuation or absorb-
ing phase) and partial (system with residual fluctuation
or active phase) efficiencies for resource allocation in this
problem. We also analyze the case where the knowledge
of the excess population is completely unknown to the
agents. It is shown both analytically and numerically
that zero fluctuation can be reached by following an an-
nealing schedule. To further incorporate the effects of
real situations, we consider the fraction of agents who
decide completely randomly. When the number of ran-
dom traders is 1, although the fluctuation can be at its
minimum, he or she is always in the majority. However,
for more than one random traders, this situation can be
avoided, maintaining a minimal fluctuation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Sec. II,
we discuss different strategies followed by the agents to
minimize the fluctuation. We show that by tuning a
suitable parameter, an active-absorbing phase transition
takes place. We elaborate on other strategies where the
agent’s knowledge of the excess population is only par-
tial or is completely absent. In Sec. III we discuss the
effects of random traders. Finally, in Sec. IV, we give
concluding remarks.
II. STRATEGY OF THE AGENTS
In the strategy followed in Ref. [11], the agents in the
majority shift with the probability
p+ =
∆(t)
M +∆(t) + 1
, (1)
and the agents in the minority remain with their choice
(p− = 0), where the total population (N = 2M + 1)
is divided as M + ∆(t) + 1 and M − ∆(t) with ∆(t) =
(|NA(t)−NB(t)| − 1)/2, where NA(t) and NB(t) are the
populations in the two choices at time t. In this strategy,
the agents can reach the zero fluctuation limit in log logN
time [11]. Although the resource utiliszation is maximum
in that case, its distribution is highly asymmetric in the
sense that after the dynamics stops in the ∆(t) = 0 limit,
the agents in the minority (majority) stay there for ever;
hence, only one group always benefits. Apart from this,
in this strategy the knowledge of ∆(t) is made available
to all the agents, which is not a general practice in MG.
In the following subsections, we introduce several vari-
ants of the above mentioned strategy. Primarily we in-
tend to find if it is possible to avoid the freezing of the
dynamics while keeping the fluctuation as low as possi-
ble. We then discuss if it is possible to achieve such states
without knowing the magnitude of ∆(t).
A. Uniform approximation in guessing the excess
crowd
Let us assume that the agents know the value of ∆(t).
We then intend to find a strategy where the dynamics of
the game does not stop and the fluctuation can be made
as small as required.
To do that we propose the following strategy: The
shifting probability of the agents in majority is
p+(t) =
∆′(t)
M +∆′(t) + 1
, (2)
[where ∆′(t) = g∆(t) and g is a constant] and that from
the minority remains zero. We will see that a steady
state can be reached in this model where the fluctuation
can be arbitrarily small.
1. Steady-state behavior
Now, to understand when such a steady state value is
possible, note that when the transfer of the crowd from
majority to minority is twice the difference of the crowd,
the minority then will become the majority and will have
the same amount of excess people as in the initial state.
Quantitatively, if the initial populations wereM+∆ and
M −∆ roughly, and if 2∆ is shifted from majority to mi-
nority, then the situation would continue to repeat itself,
as the transfer probability solely depends on the excess
crowd. Of course, this is possible only when g > 1. More
formally, if the steady-state value of ∆(t) is ∆s, then the
steady state condition would require
(M +∆s + 1)
g∆s
M + g∆s + 1
= 2∆s. (3)
This, on simplification yields either ∆s = 0 or
∆s =
g − 2
g
(M + 1). (4)
Clearly, for g < 2(= gc), ∆s = 0 would be the valid solu-
tion, since the above equation predicts a negative value
for ∆s, which indicated no steady-state saturation until
it decreases to zero. Therefore, one can predict a phase
transition of the active-absorbing type [12] by tuning the
value of g. When 0 < g < 2, the system will reach the
minimum fluctuation state where ∆(t) = 0 and the dy-
namics stops (the dynamics will differ qualitatively for
g < 1 and g > 1; see the appendix). For g > 2, how-
ever, a residual fluctuation will remain in the system,
keeping it active. Physically, this would mean that until
the guessed value of the crowd is not too incorrect (twice
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FIG. 1: Steady state values of the order parameter Os for
different values of g and x. The solid lines shows the analyt-
ical results for the pure and annealed disordered cases. Both
match very well with the simulation points. Inset shows the
log-log plot near the critical point for the disordered case,
confirming β = 1.00±0.01. All simulation data are shown for
M = 105.
as large), the agents can still find the minimum fluctua-
tion state. However, when the guess becomes too wild, a
fluctuation remains in the system.
Therefore, it is now possible to define an order param-
eter for the problem as O(t) = ∆(t)/M and its saturation
values behaves as Os = 0 when g < 2 and when M ≫ 1,
for g > 2, withOs = (g−gc)/g giving the order parameter
exponent β = 1 for this continuous transition. In Fig. 1
we plot the results of numerical simulation (M = 105) as
well as the analytical expression for the order parameter.
We find satisfactory agreement.
2. Dynamics of the system
In this simple situation, it is possible to calculate the
time dependent behavior of the order parameter both at
and above the critical point. Suppose, at a given instant
t, the populations in the two choices A and B are NA(t)
and NB(t) respectively with NA(t) > NB(t). By defini-
tion
∆(t) =
NA(t)−NB(t)− 1
2
. (5)
Moreover, the amount of the population to be shifted
from A to B using this strategy would be
S(t) =
g∆(t)
M + g∆(t) + 1
(M +∆(t) + 1)
≈ g∆(t), (6)
when ∆(t) is small compared to M , i.e., when g is close
to gc or for large time if g ≤ gc.
Clearly, NA(t + 1) = NA(t) − S(t) and NB(t + 1) =
NB(t) + S(t), giving (assuming population inversion; see
the appendix for a general treatment)
∆(t+ 1) =
NB(t+ 1)−NA(t+ 1)− 1
2
≈ g∆(t)−∆(t)− 1. (7)
Therefore, the time evolution of the order parameter
reads
dO(t)
dt
= −(2− g)O(t) − 1
M
. (8)
Neglecting the last term and integrating, one gets
O(t) = O(0) exp[−(2− g)t]. (9)
The above equation signifies an exponential decay of the
order parameter in the subcritical region (1 < g < 2).
It also specifies a time scale as τ ∼ (gc − g)−1 diverging
as the critical point is approached. These behaviors are
confirmed by numerical simulations.
In Eq. (6), the approximation was made to keep the
leading order term only. If, however, the first correction
term is kept, the expression becomes
S(t) ≈ g∆(t)− 1
M
(g2∆2(t)− g∆2(t)). (10)
The time evolution equation of the order parameter then
becomes
dO(t)
dt
= −(2− g)O(t)− g(g − 1)O2(t)− 1
M
. (11)
Now, if we consider the dynamics exactly at the critical
point, i.e., g = 2, then the first term in the right-hand-
side is zero. The last term can be neglected. Therefore,
the order parameter becomes
O(t) =
O(0)
2O(0)t+ 1
. (12)
In the long time limit O(t) ∼ t−1, giving δ = 1.
Therefore we see that under this simple approxima-
tion, the usual mean field active-absorbing transition ex-
ponents are obtained. These are confirmed using numer-
ical simulations as well. A general solution of the dy-
namics (valid for all g values at all times) is shown in the
Appendix, which in the limiting cases yield the results
mentioned above.
B. Nonuniform guessing of the excess crowd
In the above mentioned strategy one can find a steady
state for any value of the fluctuation. However, unlike
the common practice in MG, the value of ∆(t) is exactly
known to all the agents. Here we consider the case
where each agent can only make a guess about the value
of ∆(t). Therefore for the i-th agent
∆i(t) = ∆(t)(1 + ǫi), (13)
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FIG. 2: Data collapse for finding ν in the disordered case for
different x values. The estimate is ν = 1.00 ± 0.01. Inset
shows the uncollapsed data. The straight line at the critical
point gives δ = 1.00 ± 0.01. Simulation data is shown for
M = 106.
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FIG. 3: Data collapse for finding z in the disordered case
for different system sizes (M = 103, 104, 105, 106) at x = 1.0.
The estimate is z/d = 0.50±0.01. Inset shows the uncollapsed
data. The linear part in the inset confirms δ = 1.00± 0.01.
where ǫi is a uniformly distributed random number in the
range [0 : 2x] and is an annealed variable (i.e., changes
at each time step randomly) with |x| ≥ 0. Clearly,
〈∆i(t)〉 = ∆(t)(1 + 〈ǫi〉) = ∆(t)(1 + x), (14)
where 〈Q〉 (= 1/2x
2x∫
0
Qdǫ) denotes average of Q over
randomness. With the analogy of the previous case, we
expect a transition from zero to finite activity near xc =
1. In Fig. 1 we plot the steady state values of the order
parameter against (x+ 1). Clearly, the active-absorbing
transition takes place at xc = 1 (note that this is the
same point gc = 2 where the transition for the pure case
took place).
Note that irrespective of whether population inversions
occurs, one can generally write
∆(t+ 1) = |∆(t) − S(t)|, (15)
with
S(t) =
∣∣∣∣
〈
∆(t)(1 + ǫ)
M +∆(t)(1 + ǫ)
〉∣∣∣∣ . (16)
This leads to
O(t + 1) = O(t)
∣∣∣∣
〈
ǫ
1 + (1 + ǫ)O(t)
〉∣∣∣∣ . (17)
First consider the steady state where O(t+1) = O(t) =
O∗ (above the critical point). After simplification, the
above equation reduces to
(1−O∗)2xO∗
(1 +O∗)
= ln
[
1 +
2xO∗
1 +O∗
]
. (18)
One can numerically compare the solution of this equa-
tion with the simulations, which agrees well (see Fig. 1).
A small O∗ expansion of the above equation yields O∗ ∼
(x− 1), giving β = 1.
Also, for small O(t) the dynamical equation would
yield (at or above the critical point)
dO(t)
dt
= (x− 1)O(t)− xO2(t). (19)
Now, by neglecting the square term (in presence of the
linear term above the critical point) one would obtain
ν = 1 and by keeping the square term (in absence of the
linear term at the critical point) one would obtain δ = 1.
Thus all the exponents of the pure case are recovered for
annealed disorder.
One can numerically verify the above exponent values
using the following scaling form of the order parameter
(writing x+ 1 = g)
O(t) ≈ t−δF
(
t1/ν(g − gc), td/z/N
)
(20)
where d is the space dimension, which we take to be 4
in this mean field limit. At the critical point, the order
parameter follows a power-law relaxation O(t) ∼ t−δ (see
inset of Fig. 2 ) with δ = 1.00 ± 0.01. In Fig. 2 we plot
O(t)tδ against t(g − gc)ν . By knowing δ, ν can be tuned
to get data collapse. The estimate of ν is 1.00 ± 0.01.
Similarly, in Fig. 3 we plot O(t)tδ against t/Nz/d. Again
by tuning z, data collapse can be found. The estimate
for z/d comes out to be 0.50± 0.01. Thus the analytical
estimates are verified and the scaling relation δ = β/ν is
satisfied.
We have also tried the case of quenched disorder (ǫ’s
are fixed for the agents for all time). Above the criti-
cal point, when population inversion occurs, this would
imply that agents with higher ǫ would change side with
higher probability and are more likely to be in the major-
ity. A plot of average pay-off for agents having different
ǫ values verify this statement by showing the monotonic
decay of the pay-off with increasing ǫ (Fig. 4).
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FIG. 4: For quenched ǫi (in Eq. (13)) the average pay-offs of
the agents are plotted for different ǫ values having different
ranges as indicated. The monotonic decay with increasing ǫ
clearly indicates that agents with higher ǫ are more likely to
be in the majority (see last para of Sec. IIC).
C. Following an annealing schedule
In MG, information about the excess crowd is gener-
ally unknown to the agents. In the strategies mentioned
above, the excess population is known to the agents ei-
ther exactly or approximately. Here we consider the case,
where knowledge of ∆(t) is not known to the agents.
The agents follow a simple time evolution function for
the time variation of the excess population ∆T (t). To
begin with, we consider an annealing schedule
∆T (t) = ∆T (0) exp(−t/τ). (21)
where ∆T (0) is taken close to
√
M . In Figs. 5 we plot the
time variation of the actual value of excess population as
well as ∆T (t). We see that ∆(t) decreases very quickly.
Furthermore, it appears that there is a simple relation
between ∆T (t) and ∆(t) such that
2∆(t) = ∆T (t). (22)
This implies that ∆(t) ∼ 1 in logN time. Therefore,
in this strategy, even if the actual value of the excess
crowd is not supplied to the agents, they can find a state
where the fluctuation practically vanishes. We have also
checked whether this is true for some other functions as
well. We have taken functional forms such as
∆T (t) =
∆T (0)
(1 + t)α
. (23)
For all cases mentioned above we plot (see Figs. 5 ) 2∆(t)
and ∆T (t) to check if they are equal. We conclude that
this relation is not dependent on the functional form of
∆T (t) (as long as it is not too fast; see discussions below).
The response of the order parameter to the assumed
trial function can be somewhat understood as follows:
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FIG. 5: Time variation of the excess population ∆(t) are
plotted for different functional forms of ∆T (t). Left: In log-
linear scale the excess population are plotted for exponential
decay. Right: For power law (∆T (0)/(1 + t)α decay, with
different values of α). M = 5× 103 for the simulations.
The dynamical equation for O(t) would be
O(t + 1) =
|η(t)−O(t)|
1 + η(t)
, (24)
where η(t) = ∆T (t)/M . Considering the case η(t) > O(t)
(when population inversion takes place) one would arrive
at
dO(t)
dt
− (η(t) − 2)O(t) = η(t) (1− η(t)) . (25)
A general solution of the above equation will be of the
form
O(t) =
t∫
0
dt1η(t1)(1 − η(t1))e
t1∫
0
(2−η(t2))dt2
e
t∫
0
(2−η(t1))dt1
+C1e
−
t∫
0
(2−η(t1))dt1
, (26)
where C1 is a constant. This continuum limit is valid
only for the functions η(t) that do not decay too fast.
Considering η(t) < 2, one can show that the dominant
term of the solution will be of the form
O(t) ≈ η(t) (1− η(t))
2− η(t) ≈
η(t)
2
, (27)
as seen numerically. However, evaluation of Eq. (26) for
η(t) = η0 exp(−t/τ) for τ > 1/2 gives
O(t) ∼ τ
2τ − 1η(t). (28)
Therefore, O(t) ∼ η(t)/2 (as in Eq. (22)) is only true
when τ ≫ 1/2, which is the measure of slowness required
in η(t) to reduce O(t).
In the case where O(0) is large or η(t) decays too fast
(than the limit mentioned above), one would simply have
(following Eq. (24))
O(t) ∼ O(t − 1)− η(t− 1) ∼ O(0) −
t−1∑
k=0
η(k). (29)
6So, O(t) would in fact saturate to a finite value and no
population inversion will take place. This is also seen
numerically.
III. EFFECT OF RANDOM TRADERS
According to the strategies mentioned above, if the
excess population is known to the agents (which in this
case is in fact a measure of the stock’s price) the fluctua-
tions can have any small value. However, in real markets,
there are agents who follow certain strategies depending
on the market signal (chartists) and also some agents may
decide completely randomly (random traders). Here we
intend to investigate the effect of having random traders
in the market, while the rest of the populations follow
the strategies mentioned above.
Single random trader
When a single random trader is present, even when
∆(t) = 0, that trader would choose randomly irrespective
of whether he or she is in the minority or majority. This
will create a crossover between majority and minority
with an average time of two time steps. In this way, the
asymmetry in the resource distribution can be avoided.
However, that single agent will always be in the majority.
More than one random traders
As is discussed in Sec. II, when all agents follow the
strategy described by Eq. (1), after some initial dynam-
ics, ∆(t) = 0 implying that they do not change side at all.
However, with a single random trader, in an average time
period 2, as he or she selects alternatively between the
two choices, the rest of the population is divided equally
between the two choices and it is the random trader who
creates the majority by always making himself or her-
self a loser. This situation can be avoided when there
is more than one random trader. In that case, it is not
possible always to have them in the majority. There will
be configurations where some of the random traders can
be in the minority, making their time period of wining to
be 2 (due to the symmetry of the two choices). The ab-
sorbing state (for g < gc), therefore, never appears with
random traders, though the fluctuation becomes non-zero
for more than one random traders. However, if the num-
ber of random traders (= pN , where p is the fraction
of random traders) is increased, the fluctuation in the
excess population will grow eventually to N1/2(see Fig.
6). Therefore, the most effective strategy could be the
one in which (i) the fluctuation is minimum and (ii) the
average time period of gain will be 2 for all the agents,
irrespective of the fact whether they are random traders
or chartists. These two are satisfied when the number of
random traders is 2.
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FIG. 6: The saturation values of Os are plotted against g for
different fractions p of the random traders. M = 106 for the
simulations.
Furthermore, if one incorporates the random traders in
the strategy described in Sec. IIB, even the knowledge of
the excess population will not be exactly needed to reach
a state of very small fluctuations.
IV. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONS
In the stochastic strategy minority game, a very effi-
cient strategy is described by Eq. (1), where the agents
very quickly (in log logN time) get divided almost
equally (M and M + 1) between the two choices. This
strategy guarantees that a single cheater, who does not
follow this strategy, will always be a loser [11]. How-
ever, the dynamics in the system stops very quickly, mak-
ing the resource distribution highly asymmetric (peo-
ple in the majority stays there for ever) thereby mak-
ing this strategy socially unacceptable. We present here
modifications in the above mentioned strategy to avoid
this absorbing state. The presence of a single random
trader (who picks between the two choices completely
randomly) will avoid this absorbing state and the asym-
metric distribution. However, this will always make that
random trader a loser. But the presence of more than
one random trader will avoid that situation too, making
the average time period of switching between majority
and minority for all the traders (irrespective of whether
they are chatists or random traders) to be 2.
We show (in Sec. II) that by varying a parameter, the
agents can achieve any value of the fluctuation. This
is an active-absorbing type phase transition and we also
find the critical exponents analytically (β = 1, ν = 1,
δ = 1), which are well supported by numerical simula-
tions. Then we go on to reduce the knowledge of the
agents about the excess populations, which was exactly
known to the agents in the earlier strategies. We assume
that the agents can only make a guess about the excess
7population. We show using numerical simulations and
also using approximate analytical calculations that when
value of the average guess of the agents are not too bad
(less than twice the actual value) they can still reach the
state of zero fluctuation. Once again the fluctuation val-
ues increase continuously, when the guess becomes worse.
This is again an active-absorbing type phase transition
with similar values for critical indices. Next we consider
the case when the knowledge of excess crowd is com-
pletely absent for the agents. In this case the agents as-
sume a time variation (annealing schedule, see Sec. IIC)
for the excess population and they do not look at the
actual value. It is shown for several choices of the func-
tional form that the actual value of the excess population
essentially follows the assumed form and thereby goes to
zero in finite time (depending on the assumed functional
form). Again we show both analytically and numerically
that for slow enough annealing schedule the attainment
of zero fluctuation in logN time can be guaranteed. Fi-
nally, as mentioned before, we also consider the effect of
having random traders in the market who decide abso-
lutely randomly in Sec. III.
We have presented several stochastic strategies for Mi-
nority Game. We have shown that utilizing the existence
of a continuous transition (from ∆s = 0 to ∆s 6= 0)
the agents can find the state of zero or arbitrarily small
amount of fluctuation (thereby making the system so-
cially efficient) in logN time with or without knowing
the excess population. Presence or evolution of a few
(minimum 2) random traders in the population will not
only help the entire population to get out of the absorbing
state (for g < gc), but also will have a minimal fluctua-
tion or maximum social efficiency.
Stated briefly, as a population ofN agents try to evolve
a strategy such that each of them individually belong to
minority among the two choices A and B, N − 2 of them
will follow the stochastic strategy given by Eq. (1), while
the rest 2 will follow a purely random strategy. This will
ensure, as shown here, that fluctuation ∆s (∼ |NA−NB|)
will have arbitrarily small value (giving maximum social
efficiency) achieved in logN time and the absorbing state
will never appear while everyone will have an average pe-
riod of 2 in the minority/majority. Decrease in the num-
ber of random traders will either enforce the absorbing
state or indefinite stay in the majority for the random
trader, while increase in the number beyond 2 will in-
crease ∆s, eventually converging to its
√
N value. As
shown, even precise value of ∆(t) in Eq. (1) in unneces-
sary and appropriate guesses (see Sec. IIB) or appropri-
ate annealing of ∆(t) (see Sec. IIC) can achieve almost
the same results.
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Appendix A: General solution of the dynamics
In the calculations leading to Eqs. (8) and (11) we
have assumed that the two choices alternatively becomes
minority and majority (population inversion happens).
That of course is our concern while studying the active
phase (g > gc). However, as is clearly seen from the
strategy, this population inversion only happens when
g > 1. So, a more general solution of the dynamics valid
for all g can be done as follows: Consider the auxiliary
variable u(t) = |g − 1|t/O(t). Putting this in Eq. (11)
and neglecting 1/M term, one arrives at the recursion
relation
u(t+ 1) = u(t) + g|g − 1|t. (A1)
Clearly,
u(t) = u(0) +
g(1− |g − 1|t)
1− |g − 1| , (A2)
which leads to
O(t) =
1− |g − 1|
g
1(
1−|g−1|
gO(0) + 1
)
|g − 1|−t − 1
. (A3)
For the special case of g = 2 one gets back Eq. (12).
Also, one can always define the time scale for the above
equation as
τ ∼ 1| ln(|g − 1|)| . (A4)
Near the critical point g → gc = 2, the already obtained
power-law divergence ((g − gc)−1) is recovered.
Finally, for g < 1, the dynamical equation will reduce
to
O(t) ∼ O(0)
O(0) + 1
(1 − g)t. (A5)
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